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FORGIVENESS, BLAME, AND PUNISHMENT
JAMES STAIHAR*
Abstract: When someone commits a crime with no exculpa-
tory defenses, he is blameworthy and deserves to be punished.
Nevertheless, assuming the criminal were to satisfy some conditions,
he could become forgivable. In this Essay I defend a restorative
theory of what it means to forgive a criminal and when the forgive-
ness of a criminal would be warranted. My defense is unique in that
I ultimately derive my theory offorgiveness from a novel theory of
when criminals deserve to be punished. My restorative theory of
forgiveness yields at least two general insights that are generally
not appreciated in the prior literature on forgiveness. First, I argue
that, in the standard case, fully forgiving a criminal would be
warranted only if the criminal has undertaken all the punishment he
deserves. Once we are warranted in fully forgiving a criminal, the
criminal would no longer deserve any further punishment. So any
additional punishment of a criminal who has become fully forgiv-
able would be unjustified. Second, my restorative theory offorgive-
ness yields a precise distinction between two senses in which a
criminal might be unforgivable: a contingent sense and a necessary
sense. As a consequence of these insights, this Essay not only
advances the important academic literature on forgiveness, but also
yields new practical implications for how to respond to criminals.
*Assistant Professor, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of
Maryland. Associate Director, Center for the Study of Business Ethics, Regula-
tion, and Crime, University of Maryland. For financial support while working on
this Essay, I thank the University of Maryland, the University of Chicago Law
School, Princeton University's Law and Public Affairs Program, and the Univer-
sity of Michigan. For comments, I thank Elizabeth Anderson, Stephen Darwall,
Allan Gibbard, Thomas Green, Martha Nussbaum, and Gideon Rose.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider two crimes differing in degrees of seriousness.'
The first is an extremely heinous crime that Jean Hampton
describes.2 A Caucasian farmer employed an African American
farmhand and his four sons. The farmhand did something to anger
the farmer, but nothing to constitute provocation. The farmer then
murdered the farmhands by hanging them from a tree in burlap
sacks and burning them to death. I suggest that the murderer is, in
some sense, unforgivable. No matter what the murderer might do in
response to his crime, nothing would warrant fully forgiving him for
committing his heinous offense.
Now consider a second less serious cnme. An African Amer-
ican family moves to a primarily Caucasian neighborhood to take
advantage of nicer housing, better schools, and a safer environment.
But some of the Caucasian residents resist the relocation of the
African Americans. In an attempt to intimidate them into leaving,
these Caucasian residents bum a cross on the lawn of the African
American family.
Although less serious than the aggravated murder, the cross
burning is still a very serious offense. In burning the cross, the
Caucasian residents manifested insufficient concern for the African
American family's right to security in their property and freedom
II suppose the essence of a crime consists in manifesting insufficient concern for
the rights of others in committing a criminal act. The manifestations of such insuf-
ficient concern entails a degree of recklessness: an awareness of an unjustifiable
risk that one's criminal act will violate the rights of others. See Model Penal Code
§ 2.02(2)(c) (1985); Larry Alexander, Kimberly Kessley Frezen, with Stephen J.
Morse, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 23-31 (2009);
Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 93 (2000). I also assume that a more serious crime
manifests a worse deficiency in the offender's concern for the interests of others,
and the harmful results of the crime, if any, do not bear directly on its seriousness.
See e.g., Alexander, Frezen & Morse, supra, at 171-96 (arguing that the harmful
results of a crime do not affect the culpability of the offender); Joel Feinberg,
Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad But Instructive Arguments
AgainstIt, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 117 (1995).
2 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLAL. REV. 1659, 1975 (1992).
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from intimidation. Unlike the murderer, though, the cross burners do
not seem unforgivable in the same strong sense. For there seems to
be something which the cross burners could that would warrant fully
forgiving them for their crime.
In this Essay, I make sense of these different intuitions about
the two cases by defending a restorative theory of what it means to
forgive a criminal and when the forgiveness of a criminal would be
warranted. My defense is unique in that I derive my theory of for-
giveness from a novel theory of when criminals deserve to be
punished.3 My restorative theory of forgiveness yields at least two
insights that are generally not appreciated in the prior literature on
forgiveness.
First, I argue that, in the standard case, fully forgiving a
criminal would be warranted only if the criminal has undertaken all
the punishment he deserves. Once we are warranted in fully forgiv-
ing a criminal, the criminal would no longer deserve any further
punishment. So any additional punishment of the criminal would
violate his rights and, hence, be unjustified.
3 To clarify, I assume that a criminal deserves a punishment in the negative sense
that a state would not violate his rights by imposing the punishment on him against
his will. See J.L.A. Garcia, Two Concepts ofDesert, 5 LAw & PHIL. 219, 219-23
(1986) (expounding this negative sense of punitive desert). On the negative sense
of punitive desert, the fact that a criminal deserves to be punished means that he
has forfeited his right not to be punished. Cf Christopher Heath Wellman, The
Rights Forfeiture a Theory of Punishment, 122 ETHICS 371 (2012) (arguing
against several objections to the claim that criminals forfeit their right not to be
punished). I provide a summary of any novel theory of deserved punishment
below. See text accompanying infra notes 15-27. For a more extensive exposition
and defense of my theory of punitive desert, see Jim Staihar, Proportionality and
Punishment, 100 IOWAL. REV. 1209 (2015)
' In the prior literature on forgiveness, some suggest to the contrary that a state
could be justified in punishing a criminal even after others are warranted in fully
forgiving him. See, e.g., Charles Griswold, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLORATION 39 (2007); Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 32-33 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds.,
1988); Lucy Allais, Wiping the State Clean: The Heart ofForgiveness, 36 PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 33, 65 (2008).
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Second, my restorative theory of forgiveness yields a precise
distinction between two senses in which a criminal might be unfor-
givable: a contingent sense and a necessary In a contingent sense, a
criminal might be only contingently unforgivable. In a necessary
sense, a criminal might be necessarily unforgivable. As a conse-
quence of these insights, this Essay not only advances the academic
literature on forgiveness, but also yields new practical implications
for how to respond to criminals.
II. WHAT FORGIVENESS IS NOT
To focus our inquiry on the relevant concept, I start by
briefly distinguishing forgiveness from some related but distinct
ideas, such as mercy. To illustrate, a state could have mercy on the
cross burners merely by not punishing them or not forcing them to
compensate their victims. Perhaps the state chooses to have mercy
on the cross burners out of concern that the state's punishing them
or requiring them to provide compensation would have extra-
ordinarily bad effects on innocent third parties, such as the families
of the cross burners. In this case, the state would not forgive the
cross burners because the state would continue to blame them for
their offense. Unlike mercy, forgiveness essentially involves suspen-
ding feelings of blame.6
More precisely, I assume forgiveness involves the suspen-
sion of a previously warranted attitude of moral blame, such as
7
resentment or indignation. To forgive someone for committing a
5 See e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 20-21 (distinguishing mercy from forgive-
ness); Allais, supra note 4, at 47-49.
6 See e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 22 (claiming that forgiveness involves for-
swearing resentment); Allias, supra note 4, at 41 (contending that forgiveness
involves overcoming retributive emotions). Although I only focus on attitudes of
moral blame in developing any theory of forgiveness, a broader conception of
forgiveness might take forgiveness to consist in suspending a broader array of
negative emotions. Cf Norvin Richards, Forgiveness, 99 ETHIcs 77, 77-79 (1988)
(expanding the range of negative emotions whose suspension could constitute
forgiveness).
But see Joseph Butler, The Works ofJoseph Butler 136-67 (W.E. Gladstone ed.,
vol. 2, 1986) (contending that forgiveness could consist in forswearing revenge
160
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crime presupposes that the person was really blameworthy for the
offense. Forgiving is not excusing.' If a criminal was never blame-
worthy for committing his offense, then there is something to
excuse, but nothing to forgive.
Forgiveness, though, does not consist in merely ceasing to
experience feelings of blame, even an attitude of moral blame that
was once warranted. 9 For example, the African American victims of
the cross burning might cease to blame the cross burners because of
amnesia. That is, the victims might stop blaming the cross burners
because the victims might simply forget that the crime ever
occurred. But forgiving is not forgetting.
Forgiveness essentially involves suspending blame for a
reason, in response to a judgment.10 However, not just any judgment
will suffice for forgiveness." To illustrate, the victims of the cross
burning might somehow manage to cease blaming the cross burners
because the victims' prior feelings of blame were themselves were
damaging the victims' health. After all, the experience of anger or
resentment can itself be a source of anguish. This would be a "state-
based reason" to suspend blame, bearing only on whether the
victims would be warranted in desiring to blame the cross burners. 12
and moderating a previously unwarranted attitude of resentment). For this
interpretation of Butler, see Griswold, supra note 4, at 19-37.
8 See e.g., Allias, supra note 4, at 43.
9 See e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 22-23.
10 See e.g., id. at 23-24 (claiming that forgiveness involves forswearing resentment
for moral reasons); Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising Forgive-
ness, 62 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 529, 530 (2001) (taking forgiveness to
involve a judgment or change in view). For the ideas of a judgment-sensitive
attitude, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 20-24 (1998).
" See e.g., Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 35, 36-37 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988).
12 See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 37 (1990) (distinguishing the
issue of whether an attitude is rational from the issue of whether desiring the
attitude is rational, and noting that a person can rationally desire not to have a
rational attitude); Derek Parfit, Rationality and Reasons, in EXPLORING PRACTI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM ACTION TO VALUES 17, 27 (Dan Egonssson et al. eds.,
2001) I borrow the terms "state-based reason" and "object-based reason" from
2016-2017 161
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Such state-based reasons to cease blaming a criminal would under-
mine the rationality of desiring to blame the criminal, but not the
rationality of the blame itself In other words, such state-based
reasons would undermined the rationality of desiring to feel an
attitude of moral blame towards a criminal, but such reasons would
not undermine the rationality of the feelings themselves. I suggest
that forgiveness consists in suspending feelings of blame for
"object-based reasons," which would make the continual experience
of those feelings itself unwarranted. 13 However, not just any obj ect-
based reason for suspending blame will suffice for forgiveness.
To illustrate, suppose the cross burners were to become
insane sometime after committing their offense. In becoming insane,
the cross burners would lose their capacity to respond appropriately
to reasons. On a standard view of culpability, the insane as such are
not fitting targets of blame.14 So in this case, the African American
victims of the cross burning should cease blaming the cross burners
in response to their insanity. Continuing to blame the cross burners
after they become insane would be unwarranted. I suggest, though,
that the suspension of blame in response to the insanity of an
Derek Parfit. See John Broome, Reason and Motivation, 71 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
Soc. 99, 137-38 (Supp. 1997) (discussing Parfit's use of these terms).
13 For discussion about the problem of identifying the considerations relevant to
whether feeling an attitude of moral blame is warranted or, in other words, fitting
or rational, see, e.g., Stephen Darwall, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 15-17 (2006); Gibbard, supra note
12, at 36-40; Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The Moralistic Fallacy: On the
Appropriateness' ofEmotions, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 65 (2000);
Parfit, supra note 12, at 17-41; Wldoek Rabinwicz & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen,
The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value, 114 ETHICS 397
(2004).
14 Cf Scanlon, supra note 10, at 280 (describing exculpatory defenses consisting
in an incapacity to respond appropriately to reasons); Gary Watson, Responsibility
and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in PERSPECTIVES ON
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 119, 123 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds.,
1993); R.A. Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 14-3 8 (2005); Victor Tadros, CRIMI-
NAL RESPONSIBILITY 124-29 (2005); P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in
FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 8-10 (1974) (arguing that we
should take the "objective attitude" toward those who have lost their incapacity to
respond appropriately to reasons).
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offender would not constitute forgiveness because the suspension
would not be for the right kind of object-based reason. I take the
challenge of demarcating the right kind of reason to be the challenge
of developing a plausible theory of forgiveness.
III. A THEORY OF DESERVED PUNISHMENT
Ultimately, I derive my restorative account of forgiveness
from a novel theory of deserved punishment.1 5 My theory of
deserved punishment is a type of unfair advantage theory of punitive
desert. 16 In defending my theory of punitive desert, I argue that a
criminal incurs an obligation to undertake a punishment from com-
mitting his offense. The criminal deserves to be punished because
unless he suffers a punishment, he will obtain an unfair advantage
consisting in the illicit benefit of freedom from the burdens he is
obligated to undertake as a consequence of committing his crime.
The challenge in defending my theory is to explain why criminals
incur an obligation to undertake certain burdens by committing their
offenses.
When someone commits a crime without any exculpatory
defenses, I assume he undermines his trustworthiness. More pre-
cisely, he undermines the minimally acceptable degree of trustwor-
thiness that we are warranted in demanding each other not to under-
15 The summary of my theory of punitive desert that I provide below is based on
Staihar, supra note 3, at 1216-23.
16 In the literature on the justification of punishment, unfair advantage theories of
punitive desert are the most prevalent. Cf David Boonin, THE PROBLEM OF
PUNISHMENT 120 (2008) (stating that "the fairness-based approach is arguably the
preeminent form of retributivism in the currently literature"). For other variants on
unfair advantage theory of punitive desert that have been proposed in the
literature, widely discussed, and roundly criticized, see Staihar, supra note 3, at
1212-16.
17 See e.g., Susan Dimock, Retributivism and Trust, 16 L. & PHIL. 37, 53 (1997);
David A. Hoekema, Trust and Obey: Toward a New Theory of Punishment, 25
ISR. L. REv. 332, 345 (1991); Jim Staihar, Punishment as a Costly Signal of
Reform, 110 J. PHIL. 282, 284 (2013). Because trustworthiness comes in degrees,
even repeat offenders undermine their trustworthiness to an additional degree by
committing their later crimes.
2016-2017 163
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mine. A person's minimally acceptable degree of trustworthiness
consists in the conditions that are necessary for others' being
justified in believing with a minimally acceptable credence that he is
not disposed to commit crimes.
An unexcused crime undermines the offender's minimally
acceptable degree of trustworthiness because it is sufficiently strong
evidence of a standing deficiency in the offender's concern for the
rights of others, such that he lacks a sufficiently reliable character
trait not to commit crimes.18 Hence, for a range of comparably seri-
ous crimes and situations, the offender poses an unacceptably high
risk of committing such crimes over a significant run of such situa-
tions.
Unless a criminal restores his trustworthiness, he unaccept-
ably risks causing others certain especially significant harms. 19 For
example, an untrustworthy criminal unacceptably risks committing a
range of other offenses in the future. In addition, an untrustworthy
criminal also unacceptably risks causing others to incur certain costs
of insecurity, which would constitute harms to others even if the
criminal were never to commit another offense.2 0
Three costs of insecurity seem especially salient. First,
others might rationally need to invest in costly precautionary mea-
sures to protect themselves from an untrustworthy offender. For
example, they might need to engage in costly monitoring of the
criminal and to invest in costly protective services when interacting
with him is unavoidable.
Second, others might rationally need to forgo pursuing some
personally and socially valuable activities that would leave them too
vulnerable to an untrustworthy offender. In other words, people
might rationally need to reduce their activity levels in response to
18 Cf R.B. Brandt, Blameworthiness and Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 3, 14, 16-17, 32 (A.I. Melden ed., 1985) (arguing that if someone is
blameworthy for performing an act, then his performing it warrants our inferring a
motivational defect in his character).
19 See Staihar, supra note 17, at 283.
20 Cf Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (noting the
costs of insecurity that people rationally must incur in response to being justified
in believing that others are disposed to engage in acts of aggression).
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the criminal. Third, others might rationally experience higher levels
of fear in response to the higher risk of the offender's committing
crimes again.2 1 Given the significance of these costs of insecurity to
the lives of others, I presume that these costs would constitute harms
that others have a right against incurring.
To avoid the unacceptable risk of causing others to incur the
relevant harms, a criminal incurs an obligation to restore his trust-
worthiness expeditiously.22 Given this obligation of restoration, the
offender is obligated to undertake any burdens necessary to restore
his trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree. Assuming the
criminal must undertake certain burdens to do so, the state may
impose those burdens on him as a punishment against his will
without violating his rights. For unless the criminal suffers such
burdens, he will obtain an illicit benefit consisting in his freedom
from the burdens necessary to fulfill his obligation of restoration.
According to the main principle of my theory of punitive
desert, a criminal deserves a punishment for his crime that is
proportional to the burdens he must undertake to fulfill the obliga-
tion of restoration he incurs from committing his crime. In other
words, a criminal deserves a punishment that is proportional to the
burdens he is obligated to undertake to restore his trustworthiness to
23
a minimally acceptable degree. Once the criminal undertakes a
21 1 assume that insofar as an offender poses a higher risk of committing further
crimes, then others will rationally believe with a higher subjective probability that
the offender will commit further crimes. See David Lewis, A Subjectivist's Guide
to Objective Chance, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: Volume II 83 (1986) (discussing
the concept of subjective probabilities and their relation to objective probabilities).
22 A criminal is obligated to restore his trustworthiness expeditiously because the
longer he takes to restore it, the longer he will pose an unacceptable risk to others.
For a statement of the importance of restoring trustworthiness in the more general
context of reparations, see Margret Urban Walker, WHAT IS REPARATIVE JUSTICE?
25 (2010) (writing that "[t]he gesture of reparations needs to model the kind of
relationship between victims and responsible parties that creates a new or renewed
basis of trust for the future, precisely what was lacking in the circumstances in
which the wrong was done").
23 As a corollary, a criminal does not deserve a punishment for his crime that is
more severe than the burdens he must undertake to fulfill the obligation of
restoration he incurs from committing the crime. In other words, a criminal does
2016-2017 165
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXV
punishment proportional to such burdens, he deserves no more
punishment for his offense.24
Now I argue that a criminal must in fact undertake some
burdens to restore his trustworthiness. To restore it, I suggest that
the offender must signal his reform. Such a signal 25 would be a
directly observable property which is sufficiently strong evidence
that the criminal has rectified the deficiency in his concern for others
that he manifested in committing his crime.26 Offenders must restore
their trustworthiness by signaling their reform because people are
unavoidably vulnerable to each other under any acceptable system
of criminal justice available.27 No acceptable means of deterrence or
incapacitation available can adequately reduce the risks that untrust-
worthy criminals pose to others.28 Moreover, there is no reliable way
for others to induce reform in a criminal, and none seems forth-
not deserve to be punished for his crime more severely than the burdens he is
obligated to undertake to restore his trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable
degree.
24 So after the state punishes an offender in proportion to the severity of the
burdens necessary to satisfy his obligation of restoration, the state is not morally
permitted to punish the offender for the relevant offense.
25 In general, a signal is a directly observable property that is strong evidence of its
bearer's possessing another property that is not directly observable. Cf Michael
Bacharach & Diego Gambetta, Trust in Signs, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 148, 159
(Karen S. Cook ed., 2001).
26 See Staihar, supra note 17, at 287. By rectifying the deficiency in his concern
for others, the offender would develop a good will. As Annette Baier states, when
we trust others, we are confident they have a good will toward us; therefore,
"reasonable trust will require grounds for such confidence in another's good will.
... " Annette Baier, Trust andAntitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 235 (1986).
27 See Staihar, supra note 17, at 284-87; cf Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and
Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 231 (1973) (noting that "our moral language
presupposes ... that we are vulnerable creatures-creatures who can harm and be
harmed by each other").
28 See e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OxFORD J. LEG. STUD. 173 (2004); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role ofDeterrence in the Formulation of Crimi-
nal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 954, 992-94
(2003); Staihar, supra note 17, at 284-85.
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coming. 2 9 Hence, there is a need for a sign from the offender himself
that he has come to develop a sufficiently high degree of concern for
the interests of others.3 0
To be credible, I suggest that a sign of reform must be
costly. 3 1 A criminal cannot signal his reform through mere costless
means, such as merely apologizing for his crime or pleading a
change of heart. Such "cheap talk" is not credible because criminals
who do not care at all about others would be willing to convey it.32
So a credible sign of reform must be too costly for criminals who
have not rectified the revealed deficiency in their concern for
29 See e.g., Michael R. Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME 268 (1990); Staihar, supra note 17, at 286-87. Absent an exculpatory
defense, there is no form of clinical treatment that criminals can undergo which
would provide others with the needed assurance of reform.
30 At this point, I note that my theory of punitive desert is a practical theory. That
is, I seek to explain why and how much offenders deserve to be punished in the
actual world given the natural facts that generally characterize the unavoidable
conditions under which people actually live. So my theory presumes that there are
no extraordinary means available of obtaining epistemic access to or changing an
offender's disposition to commit crimes. C( John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
157-61 (1971) (developing a theory of distributive justice with a similarly practical
aim and its own presuppositions about the natural facts under which it applies).
31 See Staihar, supra note 17, at 287-88. The concept of a costly signal has wide
interdisciplinary application. See, e.g., A Michael Spence, MARKET SIGNALING
(1974) (economics); Amotz & Avishag Zahavi, THE HANDICAP (Naama Zahavi-
Ely & Melvin Patrick Ely trans., 1997) (biology); Erving Goffman, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (rev. ed., 1959) (sociology); Douglas
G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
122-58 (1994) (law). For an elementary game-theoretic analysis of signaling, see
Avinash Dixit & Susan Skeath, GAME OF STRATEGY 263-310 (2d ed., 2004). For
an application of signaling theory specifically to trust, see Bacharach & Gambetta,
supra note 25.
32 For analyses of the credibility conditions on cheap talk, see, e.g., Joseph Farrell,
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games, 5 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 514
(1993); Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERP. 103
(1996); Robert Stalnaker, Saying and Meaning, Cheap Talk, and Credibility, in
GAME THEORY AND PRAGMATICS 83 (Anton Benz, Gerhard Jager & Robert van
Rooij eds., 2005).
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others.33 In other words, a credible sign of reform must be too costly
for criminals who have not come to care sufficiently about the inter-
ests of others by developing a sufficiently benevolent character.
Thus, to demonstrate reform, I assume a criminal must send others a
costly signal that he has developed a sufficiently benevolent charac-
ter. 34 In general, benevolence is a trust warranting property that is in-
consistent with the sort of insufficient concern typical of criminals.35
To demonstrate the development of a sufficiently benevolent
character, I contend that a criminal must signal that he has acted
with a sufficiently high degree of benevolence for a sufficiently long
time after committing his crime. To show that he has acted with
such benevolence, the offender must sacrifice some of his suffi-
ciently important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for
the sake of benefiting others. To make such a sacrifice for others, I
suggest the offender must standardly engage in labor intensive com-
munity service, and he usually must do so under reasonable condi-
tions of incapacitation to mitigate the risk he poses to others while
the service is performed. The more service the criminal performs for
the sake of benefiting others, the stronger it will serve as evidence
that he has rectified the revealed deficiency in his concern for the
interests of others.36
Hence, to fulfill his obligation of restoration, and thereby
restore his trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree, a
criminal must undertake some burdens.3 7 The offender deserves to
33 This is the "non-pooling condition" on the credibility of a costly signal of
reform. Bacharach & Gambetta, supra note 25, at 160; Staihar, supra note 17, at
289.
3 See Staihar, supra note 17, at 287.
35 See e.g., Bacharach & Gambetta, supra note 25, at 154 (noting benevolence as a
trust warranting property); Staihar, supra note 17, at 287.
36 Cf Keally McBride, PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL ORDER 136 (2007) (reporting
that "prisoners who work in prison are 24 percent less likely to return to prison
after release"); Linda Radzik, MAKING AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW
AND POLITICS 99 (2009) (writing that "[t]he greater the sacrifice that is required to
make the reparation payment, the more evidence we have that the wrongdoer is
remorseful for her past action"); Staihar, supra note 17, at 287.
37 Like other trust building or maintaining processes, the process of a criminal's
restoring his trustworthiness has a "multi-layered inferential structure." Bacharach
168
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be punished in proportion to those burdens because unless he suffers
in proportion to them, he will obtain an illicit benefit consisting in
his freedom from the burdens necessary to fulfill the obligation of
restoration he incurs from committing his crime. In summary, under
my theory of punitive desert, the absolute severity of the most
severe punishment that a criminal deserves for an offense corres-
ponds to the absolute severity of the burdens that he must undertake
to fulfill the obligation of restoration he incurs from committing the
offense.
IV. BLAMING CRIMINALS
When someone commits a crime without any exculpatory
defenses, the offender not only deserves to be punished for his
crime. The offender also is blameworthy. Once others learn of the
crime, others would be warranted in blaming the criminal for com-
mitting his offense. 38 That is, others would be warranted in feeling
an attitude of moral blame toward the criminal for committing his
crime. Such an attitude of moral blame might consist in resentment
or indignation. I suggest that my theory of punitive desert illumi-
nates some of the presuppositions and demands constitutive of an
attitude of moral blame.39
& Gambetta, supra note 25, at 162. In addition to undertaking the required bur-
dens, other steps might also be necessary to restore an offender's trustworthiness,
such as the offender's apologizing for his crime and compensating any victims.
The criminal might need to undergo some form of therapy and take steps to elimi-
nate aspects of his situation that pressure him to commit crimes, such as unem-
ployment, corrupting social influences, and problems of addiction. Much will
depend on the specifics of the case. However, because these other steps are not
necessarily burdensome for the criminal, they need not be part of his punishment
properly understood.
38 Cf Justin D'Ans & Daniel Jacobson, Sentiment and Value, 110 ETHICs 722,
745 (2000) (noting that whether someone is warranted in feeling a particular
emotion, like an attitude of moral blame, toward something depends on what she
has evidence for believing about it).
'9 See Darwall, supra note 13, at 17; Strawson, supra note 14, at 14-15; Watson,
supra note 14, at 121, 126-28; Staihar, supra note 3, at 1231-32.
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When others blame a criminal for committing an offense,
they presuppose that the criminal undermined his trustworthiness by
committing the offense,40 and they demand him to restore his trust-
worthiness to a minimally acceptable degree by undertaking certain
burdens in order to demonstrate that he has reformed.4 1 The more
severe the burdens that people demand the criminal to undertake, the
more they blame him for committing his offense, and vice versa. An
attitude of moral blame toward a criminal is warranted only if the
attitude's constitutive presuppositions and demands are warranted.
Thus, I contend that there are two essential parts to blaming
a criminal: the aforementioned epistemic presupposition and
demand. As a consequence, we might cease blaming a criminal in
one of two ways. On the one hand, we might give up the epistemic
presupposition. That is, we might conclude that the crime really did
not undermine the offender's trustworthiness. In this case, we would
presume that the criminal has an exculpatory defense, such as an
excuse or justification. Perhaps, the offender was provoked, invol-
untarily intoxicated, or suffering from some other condition that
temporarily diminished his capacity to respond appropriately to
reasons at the time he committed the crime. As a consequence, the
criminal's offense is not sufficiently strong evidence of a standing
motivational defect in his character at the time of assessment.42
40 The epistemic presuppositions of blaming criminals on my view are similar to
those made under T. M. Scanlon's view of blame. Cf T. M. Scanlon, MORAL
DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 122-23 (2008).
41 See Staihar, supra note 3, at 1231-32.
42 According to a character theory of excuses, a consideration constitutes an
excuse if it blocks the otherwise justified inference from the fact that someone
performed a criminal act to her having a motivational defect in her character at the
time of assessment. See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and
Criminal Responsibility, 1 L. & PHIL. 5 (1982); R. B. Brandt, A Motivational
Theory ofExcuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: Nomos XXVII 165
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); Richard B. Brandt, A
Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHIL. REV. 337 (1969); cf Scanlon, supra note
10, at 277-79 (suggesting that some considerations constitute excuses because they
"sever the connection between the action or attitude and the agent's judgments and
character"); Strawson, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that "[w]e shall not feel
resentment against the man he is for the action done by the man he is not; or at
least we shall feel less"); Watson, supra note 14, at 123 (describing excuses that,
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On the other hand, even if we retain the epistemic presup-
position, we can have other reasons to suspend the demand on the
criminal to restore his trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable
degree. In other words, even if we presume that an offender really
did undermine his trustworthiness by committing his crime, we can
have reason to cease demanding him to restore his trustworthiness to
a minimally acceptable degree. A subset of these reasons is constitu-
tive of my proposed restorative theory of forgiveness.
V. A RESTORATIVE THEORY OF FORGIVENESS
A. What Forgiveness Means
To forgive a criminal for committing an offense, I contend
that we must suspend blaming him for the right reason. According to
my restorative theory of forgiveness, the right reason consists in
judging that the criminal has restored his trustworthiness by signal-
ing his reform.4 3 To signal his reform, the offender must demon-
strate that he has rectified the revealed deficiency in his concern for
others that he manifested in committing his crime.
according to Strawson, "present the other ... as acting uncharacteristically due to
extraordinary circumstances").
43 Cf Aurel Kolnai, Forgiveness, 74 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 91, 101 (1973)
(taking forgiveness to involve judging that the forgiven has undergone a change of
heart); Murphy, supra note 4, at 24 (stating that one reason people forgive is that
the wrongdoer repented or had a change of heart); Griswold, supra note 4, at 50
(suggesting that forgiveness involves judging that the wrongdoer has shown
through deeds and words a commitment "to becoming the sort of person who does
not inflict injury").
" Although my theory specifically concerns forgiving people for committing
crimes, it could also explain forgiving criminals for their bad character traits or,
more precisely, the motivational defects in their character that they manifested in
committing their crimes. On the possibility of forgiving someone for her bad
character, see Macalester Bell, Forgiving Someone for Who They Are (and Not
Just What They've Done), 77 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 625 (2008).
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B. Degrees of Forgiveness: Full versus Partial
Under my restorative theory, forgiveness can be full or
partial. Before someone commits an offense, others are justified in
believing with a particular baseline credence that she is not disposed
to commit crimes. Her offense undermines her trustworthiness by
lowering to an unacceptable degree the credence with which others
are justified in believing that she is not disposed to commit cnmes.
Hence, by committing an offense, a criminal's trustworthiness is
undermined to a degree. Similarly, an offender's trustworthiness can
also be restored to a degree.
Fully forgiving someone for committing a crime involves
judging that she has fully restored her trustworthiness to a minimally
acceptable degree. That is, fully forgiving someone for committing
an offense involves judging that the criminal has justified others in
believing with a minimally acceptable credence that she has fully
rectified the revealed deficiency in her concern for the rights of
others that she manifested in committing her crime. Hence, our fully
forgiving someone for committing a crime involves our suspending
all the blame we felt toward her for committing the crime.
Mere partial forgiveness, though, involves a correspondingly
weaker judgment and is consistent with our continuing to feel some
residual blame toward an offender. When we partially forgive a
criminal for committing an offense, we judge that she has restored
her trustworthiness to a degree, but not to a minimally acceptable
degree. We judge that the criminal has partially, but not fully,
rectified the revealed deficiency in her concern for the rights of
others. So we continue to demand the offender to restore her trust-
worthiness to a higher degree. In partially forgiving a criminal, we
mitigate how much we blame her, but we continue to feel some
residual degree of blame.
C. Who Can Forgive: Three Perspectives
Under my restorative theory, forgiveness can be given from
three distinct perspectives, corresponding to three distinct attitudes
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of moral blame. As a personal reactive attitude, a direct victim of
a crime is warranted in feeling resentment toward the offender.46 As
an impersonal reactive attitude, anyone is warranted in feeling
indignation toward a criminal . To forgive a criminal from the
perspective of a direct victim or an unrelated third party, the victim
or third party must suspend their resentment or indignation toward
the criminal by judging that the criminal has restored his trust-
worthiness by signaling his reform.
As a self-reactive attitude, the criminal himself is warranted
in feeling guilty for committing his offense.4 9 Mutatis mutandis, the
same presuppositions and demands constitutive of resentment and
indignation are also constitutive of guilt. In feeling guilty for com-
mitting an offense, the criminal himself presupposes that he under-
mined his trustworthiness by committing the offense, and he
demands himself to restore his trustworthiness by undertaking
certain burdens in order to demonstrate to others that he has
reformed. To forgive himself for committing his crime, I contend
that the offender must suspend his feelings of guilt in response to his
judging that he has signaled his reform to others.
Thus, my restorative theory makes room for the idea of self-
forgiveness, in addition to forgiveness by others.
D. Five Values of Forgiveness
Under my restorative theory, forgiveness could promote at
least five related values. First, forgiving a criminal might itself make
the criminal marginally more trustworthy because trust is marginally
1 See Strawson, supra note 14, at 13-15.
4 6 id.
4 7 id.
48 Although some assume that only the victim of a crime can forgive the criminal,
there is no principled reason to hold such a narrow view of who has standing to
forgive an offender. See Eve Garrard & David McNaughton, In Defence of
Unconditional Forgiveness, 104 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc. 39, 45 n.6 (2003)
(leaving room for forgiveness from third parties other than the direct victims of the
wrongful acts).
49 See Strawson, supra note 14, at 15.
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self-fulfilling.o When others forgive a criminal, they increase their
trust in him. People desire to be trusted because trust is an attitude of
esteem and necessary for valuable personal relationships, such as
friendships and employment. Hence, forgiving a criminal provides
him with a personal benefit that he should desire to preserve by not
doing anything to undermine it, namely committing additional
offenses. Because forgiveness can provide a criminal with an incen-
tive not to commit additional crimes, it could make the criminal
marginally more trustworthy.
Second, when others are warranted in forgiving an offender,
they can rationally reduce the costs of insecurity they incur in
response to the offender. So others can rationally fear the criminal
less, rationally increase their activity levels, and rationally decrease
their investments in protecting themselves from the criminal.
Third, since forgiveness involves suspending feelings of
blame, it can benefit the relationships, projects, and commitments of
those who felt blame. For the feeling of blame itself can be an all-
consuming experience, impairing one's capacity to sustain important
aspects of one's life.5 2
Fourth, forgiveness could promote reconciliation with the
criminal, making possible many valuable relationships with him that
require his trustworthiness, such as relationships of friendship or
employment.
Fifth, a criminal's self-esteem could improve as a conse-
quence of forgiving him. People are usually ashamed to be the target
of warranted blame, regarded as untrustworthy in such a serious
way.
50 See, e.g., Kolnai, supra note 43, at 102-05; Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust,
24 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 202, 212-17 (1995).
51 It is important to emphasize that the trust warranting effect of forgiveness is
both marginal and contingent. Merely forgiving a criminal would not fully restore
his trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree. Moreover, the trust war-
ranting effect of forgiveness presumes that the criminal cares about people's
attitudes and relations to him. To prove that he cares, I suggest the criminal must
signal his reform to at least a degree. See Kolnai, supra note 43, at 103 (stating
that if a wrongdoer has provided no sign of a change of heart, then the reconciling
or reforming effect of forgiveness would be "utterly dubious").
52 See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 11, at 36-37.
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VI. NEW IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FORGIVENESS OF CRIMINALS
A. Punishment and Forgiveness
1. A Constraint
As a consequence of my accounts of forgiveness, blame, and
deserved punishment, I contend that we are standardly warranted in
fully forgiving someone for committing a crime only if he has
undertaken all the punishment he deserves. Hence, no one, including
a state, would be justified in punishing an offender further after full
forgiveness is warranted. Punishing a criminal more than he
deserves would violate his rights, and no one would be justified in
- * 53
violating someone's rights.
To illustrate, consider again the cross burners. By commit-
ting their crime, the cross burners undermined the minimally accept-
able degree of trustworthiness that we are warranted in demanding
them not to undermine. Their crime justifies our believing with an
unduly high credence that they are disposed to commit crimes,
particularly against African Americans. Their crime reveals a seri-
ous deficiency in their concern for the rights of others, especially the
rights of African Americans.
Now suppose people blame the cross burners for their crime.
In doing so, their African American victims feel resentment toward
them, and other third parties feel indignation toward them. In feeling
these attitudes, others demand the cross burners to restore their trust-
worthiness to the minimally acceptable degree by signaling their
reform.
To signal their reform, the cross burners must apologize to
their African American victims and provide them with compensa-
51 See Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 30-33 (1974) (defending a
conception of rights as "side constraints").
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tion for the harm caused. But although necessary, that might not be
sufficient to signal reform for reasons we have discussed. An apol-
ogy is cheap talk, and providing compensation need not be burden-
some, especially if paid by a third party on behalf of the cross
burners, such as a friend or other benefactor. So even if the cross
burners had not become at all benevolent, they could still be willing
to provide an apology and compensation to their African American
victims.
To provide a credible sign of reform, the cross burners must
sacrifice some of their sufficiently important personal interests for a
sufficiently long time for the sake of benefiting others. More speci-
fically, for some small number n, the cross burners must engage in n
years of labor intensive community service, and they must do so
under reasonably humane conditions of incapacitation, in a prison,
to mitigate the costs of insecurity that others rationally must incur
while the service is performed. That is punishment.56
Now suppose the state sentences the cross burners accord-
ingly, and they are cooperative, willing to restore their trustworthi-
ness. The cross burners apologize to the African American family,
provide compensation to them, and undertake the required punish-
51 Cf Griswold, supra note 4, at 49-50 (suggesting that warranted forgiveness
requires the wrongdoer to communicate contrition and regret that she performed
the wrongful act).
55 In the epilogue to Crime and Punishment, I suggest that Feodor Dostoevsky ges-
tures at the personal sacrifice required of a criminal to signal reform. Dostoevsky
writes that after Raskolnikov confesses to his crime, he is sent to prison. As
Raskolnikov contemplates the new life he will lead after his release from prison,
Dostoevsky writes that "the new life would not be his for nothing, that it must be
dearly bought, and paid for with great and heroic struggles yet to come ... that is
the beginning of a new story, the story of the gradual renewal of a man, of his
gradual regeneration, of his slow progress from one world to another, of how he
learned to know a hitherto undreamed-of reality." Feodor Dostoevsky, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 527 (Jessie Coulson trans., George Gibian ed., 1964).
56 Although not necessary, a restorative punishment could also express an apology
and provide compensation to any victims. Cf R. A. Duff, PUNISHMENT, COMMUN-
ICATION, AND COMMUNITY 106 (noting that a criminal's undertaking a punishment
for her crime can constitute a forceful expression of her apology). A mere apology
or compensation, though, could be provided through non-punitive means that are
distinct from a criminal's punishment properly understood.
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ment for the sake of helping others. The cross burners undertake n
years of labor intensive community service for the sake of benefiting
others, particularly other African Americans.
In prison, the cross burners work to produce goods, such as
clothes or medical supplies, that are distributed to African Ameri-
cans in need. The cross burners are paid a small wage for their labor,
and they consent to the state's garnishing the wage and distributing
it to their victims and other African Americans in need. After
increasing their trustworthiness, the cross burners even work as
tutors for African American prisoners, teaching them any special
knowledge they might have to share about useful trades or subjects.
By the end of their n year sentences, the cross burners have
restored their trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree.
They have justified our believing with a minimally acceptable
credence that they are no longer disposed to commit crimes, even
against African Americans. The cross burners have demonstrated
that they have rectified the revealed deficiency in their concern for
the rights of others, particularly African Americans. The cross
burners have fully fulfilled their obligation of restoration. So there is
no unfair advantage that they stand to obtain if they are not punished
more. Therefore, the cross burners do not deserve any additional
punishment. Their n year restorative sentences were all the punish-
ment they deserved for their crime of cross burning.
Others are now warranted in fully forgiving the cross burners.
We are now justified in judging that the cross burners have fully
restored their trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree by
signaling their reform. So others should now suspend all their resent-
ment or indignation toward the cross burners for committing their
crime. To blame the cross burners more would either (a) presuppose
the unjustified judgment that they are more untrustworthy than they
really are or (b) express an unwarranted demand on them to increase
their trustworthiness beyond a minimally acceptable degree. Thus,
after others are warranted in fully forgiving the cross burners for their
5 For a more detailed discussion of how a state imposed punishment could
constitute a credible sign of an offender's reform, see Staihar, supra note 17, at
287-92.
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hate crimes, no one, including the state, would be justified in punish-
ing them more. Any additional punishment of the cross burners
would be undeserved, violating their rights and expressing too much
blame toward them.
2. The Electivity of Forgiveness
Under my restorative theory of forgiveness, once others are
no longer warranted in blaming the cross burners because they have
signaled their reform, there is a sense in which forgiving them is not
elective. Unless we forgive the cross burners after they have restored
their trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree, we would
feel too much blame toward them, too much resentment or indigna-
tion. And it would be irrational to feel an unwarranted attitude of
moral blame toward the cross burners.
That said, there is still another sense in which forgiving the
cross burners would be elective even if they were to signal their
reform: Forgiveness is never obligatory. 59 Forgiveness consists in
suspending attitudes of moral blame for the right reason. But there is
nothing directly harmful to anyone in merely feeling an unwarranted
attitude toward someone. Therefore, even if the cross burners were
to signal their reform, I suggest they would not be warranted in
demanding anyone's forgiveness. Instead, the cross burners should
merely request forgiveness. Their request would express a desire to
be trusted, and so would increase the trust warranting effect of
forgiving them.60
To appreciate the limits on the elective nature of forgiveness,
though, attitudes of moral blame should be distinguished from the
58 See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970) (discussing the
conceptual connection between punishment and the expression of moral blame);
Scanlon, supra note 10, at 267; Staihar, supra note 3, at 131-32.
59 See Griswold, supra note 4, at 67-69; David Sussman, Kantian Forgiveness, 96
KANT-STUDIEN 85, 87 (2005).
60 See Griswold, supra note 4, at 50 n.8 (crediting Ken Taylor with noting that
when an offender requests or invites rather than demands forgiveness, he "shows
respect and sympathy for his victim").
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acts that they could motivate. I suggest that although irrational
people are not obligated to suspend any unwarranted resentment or
indignation toward criminals who have signaled their reform, such
irrational people are nevertheless obligated not to punish or burden
such offenders more on the unjustified assumption that they are still
blameworthy. Thus, assuming the cross burners were to signal their
reform, no one, including the state, would be permitted to hold their
crimes against them in ways harmful to them. As a consequence, the
following legal restrictions on the future liberty of the cross burners
would be morally impermissible after they have signaled their
reform: laws denying them the right to vote, laws restricting their
employment opportunities, and laws mandating the public display of
shameful badges akin to the Scarlet Letter, such as yard signs sum-
marizing their criminal records.
B. The Unforgivable
1. A Contingent Sense
Under my restorative theory of forgiveness, criminals can be
unforgivable in two distinct senses: one contingent, the other
necessary. If an offender is contingently unforgivable, then she has
the capacity to restore her trustworthiness by signaling her reform.
But she simply has not. Perhaps the offender is defiant and chooses
not to signal her reform by remaining defiant.6 1 A contingently
unforgivable criminal does not warrant forgiveness. However, a
contingently unforgivable criminal could warrant forgiveness if she
simply chose to undertake the right kind of punishment in the right
way as a means to signaling her reform.
6 For an explanation of why and how much a defiant criminal deserves to be
punished under my theory of punitive desert, see Staihar, supra note 3, at 1224-26.
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2. A Necessary Sense
If a criminal is necessarily unforgivable, then he is blame-
worthy and deserves to be punished for his offense. However, he
lacks the capacity to restore his trustworthiness to a minimally
acceptable degree.
In this necessary sense, we must further distinguish between
being fully and only partially unforgivable. No one can be fully
unforgivable in the necessary sense. If a criminal were, he would
lack the capacity to restore his trustworthiness to any degree. But for
a criminal to be at all blameworthy, others must be warranted in
demanding him to restore his trustworthiness at least partially.6 2
People are not warranted in demanding someone to do something
that he lacks the capacity to do. That would be unfair: ought implies
63
can.
A criminal might, though, be partially unforgivable in the
necessary sense. An offender might have the capacity to restore his
trustworthiness to a degree, but not to a minimally acceptable
degree.64 If a criminal is partially unforgivable in the necessary
sense, then others could not cease blaming him in response to a
warranted judgment that he has fully restored his trustworthiness to
a minimally acceptable degree.
To illustrate, consider again the Caucasian farmer who
committed an aggravated murder by burning to death his African
62 As discussed earlier, blaming someone for committing a crime constitutively
involves both a) presupposing that the crime undermined her trustworthiness and
b) demanding that she restore her trustworthiness to the minimally acceptable
degree. See text accompanying supra notes 38-42.
63 See, e.g., David Copp, 'Ought'Implies 'Can', Blameworthiness, and the Princi-
ple of Alternate Possibilities, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE
POSSIBILITIES 265, 271-75 (David Widerker & Michael McKenna eds., 2003);
Immanuel Kant, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:380 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996)
(stating that "he must judge that he can do what the law tells him unconditionally
that he ought to do").
64 Cf Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and the Unforgivable, 36 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 69-71
(1999) (emphasizing that even persons who commit atrocities can undergo some
positive moral changes in their character).
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American farmhands.65 The murderer undermined his trustworthi-
ness to an extremely bad degree by committing his crime. The crime
justifies our believing with an extremely high credence that the
murderer is disposed to commit extremely serious crimes. For the
murder reveals an extremely bad deficiency in his concern for the
rights of others.
Given the inevitable constraints on the duration of a human
life, there might be nothing that the murderer can do to restore his
trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable degree. It is possible that
he cannot justify our believing with a minimally acceptable
credence that he has fully rectified the revealed deficiency in his
concern for the rights of others. Nevertheless, the murderer can still
partially restore his trustworthiness. He can justify our believing
with a range of higher credences that he has come to care increas-
ingly more about the interests of others.
By partially restoring his trustworthiness, the murderer
would mitigate the risk he poses to others. By mitigating the risk,
the murderer would mitigate the costs of insecurity that others, such
as prison officials and fellow inmates, rationally must incur in
response to him. Thus, the murderer is obligated to restore his
trustworthiness as much as he can. And to do so, he might need to
undertake a life sentence of labor intensive community service
under reasonably humane conditions of incapacitation, in a prison.
Given that the murderer is extremely blameworthy for his
offense, suppose we feel an extremely high degree of indignation
toward him. In blaming the murderer to such an extremely high
degree, we justifiably presuppose that his crime undermined his
trustworthiness to an extremely bad degree, and we justifiably
demand him to restore his trustworthiness as much as he can by
undertaking a sufficiently burdensome life sentence.66
Now suppose the state sentences the murderer accordingly,
and he is cooperative. He apologizes for committing his murder. He
65 See Hampton, supra note 2, at 1675.
66 For an explanation of why we would not be warranted in demanding the
murderer, or any other criminal, to undertake the death penalty, see Staihar, supra
note 3, at 1227.
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compensates the relatives of his African American victims for their
suffering as much as he can. And he devotes the rest of his life, in
prison, to labor intensive community service for the sake of bene-
fiting others, especially African Americans.
While the murderer undertakes this lifelong restorative pun-
ishment, we are warranted in partially forgiving him for his crime on
a continuous, gradual basis. As he undertakes his restorative punish-
ment, we ought to mitigate the degree of blame we feel toward him,
decreasing the degree of indignation we feel toward him. As he
undertakes his restorative sentence, we are justified in judging that
he has partially restored his trustworthiness to continuously higher
degrees, signaling that he has partially rectified the extremely bad
deficiency in his concern for the rights of others that he manifested
in committing the murder.
Given the seriousness of his crime, though, we could never
be warranted in fully forgiving the murderer. We could never be
warranted in judging that he has restored his trustworthiness to a
minimally acceptable degree, demonstrating that he has fully recti-
fied the revealed deficiency in his concern for others. This is the
sense in which the murderer is necessarily unforgivable in a way
that the cross burners are not.
VII. CRITICAL DISCUSSION:
TWO COMPETING VIEWS OF FORGIVENESS
A. First Competing View: Epistemic Abstinence
Critics might object that my restorative theory of forgiveness
is too narrow, and my conception of the unforgivable is too broad.
When someone commits a crime without any exculpatory defenses,
her crime is strong evidence of a standing deficiency in her concern
for the interests of others. So if the criminal does not demonstrate
her reform, we are epistemically permitted to infer that there is a
motivational defect in her character at the time of assessment.
However, critics might contend that we are not epistemically
required to draw this negative inference about a criminal's character
even if there is no sign of reform. We could rationally abstain from
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inferring anything negative about a criminal's character on the basis
of her unexcused offense. So even if a criminal does not demon-
strate reform, critics might claim that we could rationally regard the
criminal's character as being just as good as we could have regarded
it if she had not committed her crime in the first place.
Under this competing account of forgiveness, critics might
contend that forgiving a criminal could consist in simply abstaining
from inferring anything bad about her character on the basis of her
crime and not feeling hostile toward her as a result of her crime. On
this competing account, one standard reason for forgiving a criminal
would be her signaling reform. But this is not the only reason for
forgiveness, even of a warranted kind. The class of relevant reasons
is left open. As a consequence, a criminal is neither contingently nor
necessarily unforgivable merely because she is unrepentant or lacks
the capacity to restore her trustworthiness to a minimally acceptable
degree.67
In response, I reject this more open-ended alternative
account of forgiveness for at least two reasons. First, this alternative
account is not psychologically possible or rational for normal
people. To illustrate, suppose the racist murderer remains persistent-
ly defiant and unapologetic, after killing African American farm-
hands. We know his crime is strong evidence of an extremely bad
deficiency in his concern for the rights of others. But on the critic's
alternative account of forgiveness, we might forgive the murderer by
simply not updating our credences about the badness of his charac-
ter. That is not psychologically possible, though, for normal people.
Beliefs aim at the truth. So conclusions about what is evi-
dence for what typically close deliberation about what to believe
with what credence. Once normal people understand the evidentiary
significance of the murderer's crime for his character, then in the
absence of countervailing evidence, they will straightaway regard
his character as worse. Insofar as abnormal people do not draw this
negative inference about the murderer's character, they are epistem-
67 See Allais, supra note 4, at 59-68 (endorsing a similar alternative conception of
forgiveness that competes with my own).
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ically irrational, and their purported forgiveness should be regarded
as unwarranted.
Second, the critic's alternative account of forgiveness does
not capture the "honorific" nature of forgiveness, which is a key
68feature distinguishing forgiveness from mercy. Unlike recom-
mending mercy for a criminal, I suggest that we convey something
honorable about a criminal when we say that forgiving the criminal
would be warranted. On my view, saying that forgiving a criminal
would be warranted implies that the criminal has restored his trust-
worthiness. Under the critic's alternative view of forgiveness,
though, being warranted in forgiving a criminal entails nothing
esteemable about the criminal. On the critic's rival account, being
forgiven might be no more honorable than having one's crime
forgotten.
B. Second Competing View:
The Hardship of Demonstrated Reform
Under a second alternative account of forgiveness, critics
might accept that forgiving a criminal involves suspending a
demand on him to restore his trustworthiness. However, contrary to
my restorative theory, critics might deny that forgiveness essentially
involves suspending this demand in response to the judgment that
the criminal has signaled his reform. Instead, critics might contend
that forgiveness could consist in releasing a criminal from his
obligation of restoration because of the hardship that the criminal
himself would suffer by reforming and signaling his reform. 69 There
is nothing necessarily irrational about releasing a criminal from his
obligation to restore his trustworthiness out of a purely altruistic
concern for the welfare of the criminal himself
In response, I reject this competing conception of forgive-
ness on the ground that it too fails to capture the honorific quality of
68 C( Bell, supra note 44, at 632 (referring to forgiveness as "honorific").
69 See Cheshire Calhoun, Changing One's Heart, 103 ETHICS 76, 91-96 (1992)
(proposing a similar alternative conception of forgiveness that competes with my
own).
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forgiveness. I do not deny that in extraordinary cases, it can be
rationally permissible to release a criminal from his obligation of
restoration out of an altruistic concern for the criminal himself I
simply deny that such a release counts as forgiveness. Suspending
the demand on a criminal to restore his trustworthiness out of a
purely altruistic concern for the criminal conveys nothing esteem-
able about him. Instead, I suggest that suspending blame toward a
criminal for purely altruistic reasons should count as having mercy
on him, not forgiving him. Unlike its rival, my restorative theory of
forgiveness has the virtue of not conflating mercy with forgiveness.
VIII. TWO CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. Forgiving versus Condoning
Any plausible theory of forgiveness must distinguish the
idea of forgiving from the idea of condoning.70 Condoning a crime
involves expressing an attitude of moral approval toward the
commission of the crime itself Now under my restorative theory of
forgiveness, forgiving a criminal does express an attitude of moral
approval. But forgiveness in no way expresses approval of the crime
he committed. Forgiving a criminal does not involve a change in
judgment about (a) the seriousness of his crime or (b) the criminal's
initial blameworthiness for committing the crime.
Rather, under my theory, forgiveness expresses approval
toward the way that a criminal has responded to his crime. Forgive-
ness involves a change in judgment about the moral quality of the
criminal's character at the time of assessment. For this reason,
forgiveness makes reconciling with a criminal rationally possible
without condoning the crime he committed.
7o See Kolnai, supra note 43, at 95-98 (emphasizing the distinction between
forgiving and condoning).
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B. Forgiveness and Human Solidarity
Some scholars contend that there is an important connection
between the justification of forgiveness and the value of "human
solidarity."7 1 I suggest that my restorative theory of forgiveness best
reflects the value of human solidarity. For any community to flou-
rish, its members must satisfy some minimal standards of trustwor-
thiness. Unless people can count on each other to respect their rights
codified in core criminal laws, the resulting costs of insecurity
would be intolerable. Hence, there are standing demands on all to
manifest good will toward each other in the minimal sense of
respecting each other's rights.72 Once someone flouts this demand
by committing a crime, the point of forgiving him just is to recog-
nize and accept his subsequent restoration of the minimally accept-
able degree of trustworthiness necessary to realizing the value of
human solidarity in a community.
71 See Garrard & McNaughton, supra note 48, at 53-59.
72 Cf Strawson, supra note 14, at 14-15.
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